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The Sony and OPM Double Whammy:
International Law and Cyber "Attacks"
Tim McCormack*
I. CHARACTERIZING CYBER "ATTACKS"
One reality of dramatically increasing electronic connectivity is a com-
mensurate increase in vulnerability to disruption., Computer network attacks
are now so ubiquitous that they have become a hallmark of 21st century
digital life. Reports suggest that, in 2014 alone, in excess of 317 million new
pieces of malware were produced and released-a figure that translates into a
staggering nearly one million new pieces of malware created on average
every single day of the year. 2 The trouble lies in the fact that software is
fundamental to electronic functionality, and yet software is exceedingly diffi-
cult to produce without flaw.3 Exploitation of flaws in software via a release
of targeted malware is not only commonplace but increasingly innovative,
sophisticated, and audacious.4
Fortune magazine claimed that the 2014 hack of Sony Pictures "terri-
fied corporate America" and devastated the company-particularly with the
loss of massive amounts of sensitive company data, including details of unre-
leased movies.5 The devastation's extent exposed significant vulnerabilities
in the corporation's hardware (the malware destroyed the functionality of
most of Sony's desktops and laptops) and its data. Much of the compromised
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1. See, e.g., Patrik Maldre, Global Connections, Regional Implications: An Over-
view of the Baltic Cyber Threat Landscape, INT'L CTR. FOR DEF. & SECURITY
EsT. (Oct. 19, 2015), http://www.icds.ee/publications/article/global-connec-
tions-regional-implications-an-overview-of-the-baltic-cyber-threat-landscape/.
2. Id. at 9.
3. Id.
4. See id.
5. See Peter Elkind, Inside the Hack of the Century, FORTUNE (July 1, 2015),
http://fortune.com/sony-hack-part-1/.
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data included sensitive personal identification details of Sony's employees
and personal e-mails of Sony management. 6 The more recent hack of the
U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) resulted in the colossal theft of
sensitive personal information of an estimated 21.5 million U.S. government
employees-including Social Security numbers security clearance applica-
tion records and digital fingerprint records.7 Anecdotal evidence suggests that
some of the stolen data has already been sold and used for attempted identity
fraud.8 Both Sony and the OPM are currently threatened with lawsuits,9 in-
cluding, in the case of the OPM, by federal unions and disgruntled current
and former U.S. government employees.0 The Office understands now, if it
did not already, just how disgruntled victims of data theft can be.
Expressions of outrage were understandably common responses to both
the Sony and the OPM hacks. Business Insider quoted Dave Aitel, former
NSA research scientist and current CEO of Immunity, a cybersecurity firm,
who characterized the Sony hack as an "act of war" and called for a reassess-
ment on just how serious cyber attacks really are for U.S. national security.II
Similarly, Noah Rothman, writing for Commentary, chose to characterize the
OPM hack as the nation's "cyber Pearl Harbor" because, he claimed, the
6. BBC reported the theft of more than 100 terabytes of data from Sony Pictures.
See Kevin Rawlinson, Sony Boss: 'No Playbook' for Dealing With Hack At-
tack, BBC (Jan. 9, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-30744834.
7. Julie Hirschfeld Davis, Hacking of Government Computers Exposed 21.5 Mil-
lion People, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/10/
us/office-of-personnel-management-hackers-got-data-of-millions.html? r=0;
Ellen Nakashima, Hacks of OPM Databases Compromised 22.1 Million Peo-
ple, Federal Authorities Say, WASH. POST (July 9, 2015), https://www.wash-
ingtonpost.com/news/federal-eye/wpl2015/07/09/hack-of-security-clearance-
system-affected-2 1-5-million-people-federal-authorities-say/.
8. Jack Moore, Congressman: OPM Hack Data Being Used to Attempt Identity
Theft, NEXTGOV.COM (Oct. 6, 2015), http://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/
2015/10/congressman-opm-hack-data-being-used-attempt-identity-theft/1226
04/.
9. See Seth Rosenblatt, Sony Sued by Former Employees Over Hack, CNET (Dec.
16, 2014, 2:30 PM), http://www.cnet.com/news/sony-sued-by-current-former-
employees-over-hack/.
10. See Sam Ufret, Former Fed Files a Class-Action Lawsuit Against OPM for
Cyber Breach, FED. NEWS RADIO.COM (Aug. 18, 2015, 2:12 PM), http:/feder-
alnewsradio.com/opm-cyber-breach/2015/08/another-lawsuit-way-opm-cyber-
breach/.
11. Michael B. Kelley & Armin Rosen, The U.S. Needs to Stop Pretending The
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hack was aimed at the "preventative neutering of America's defensive
capabilities." 2
Claims such as these are not the exclusive domain of public commenta-
tors. Democratically elected politicians, ever conscious of answering to their
electorates, have seized upon this terminology and forcefully argued that the
United States is subject to a new form of warfare that demands a robust
response. Senator John McCain of Arizona, for example, disagreed with
President Obama's characterization of the Sony hack as "an act of cyber-
vandalism that was very costly, very expensive."13 Senator McCain claimed
on CNN's State of the Union Program that
[t]he president does not understand that this is a manifestation of a
new form of warfare... . When you destroy economies, when you
are able to impose censorship on the world and especially the
United States of America, it's more than vandalism. It's a new
form of warfare that we're involved in, and we need to react and
react vigorously.14
Representative Carolyn Maloney of New York, in the context of a con-
gressional hearing following the OPM hack, claimed that she considered this
"attack . . . a far more serious one to the national security of our country"15
than the attacks of 9/11 because of the scale of the hack and the apparently
coordinated effort to steal specific and comprehensive personal information
on millions of key employees of the U.S. government. 16
Of course, others, including public commentators, academics, and
elected decision-makers, have disavowed these characterizations of the hacks
and argued that, while serious, even devastating, these hacks amount neither
to acts of war nor to anything approximating a "cyber Pearl Harbor" or a
"cyber 9/11."17
12. Noah Rothman, The Terrible Scale of the Chinese Cyber-Pearl Harbor Attack,
COMMENTARY (June 12, 2015), https://www.commentarymagazine.com/for-
eign-policy/asia/cyber-pearl-harbor-gets-worse/.
13. Kate Sheppard, McCain Calls Sony Hack an 'Act of War', HUFFINGTON POST
(Dec. 21, 2014, 11:16 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/12/21/sony-
north-korea-war n_6362454.html?.
14. Id.
15. Kristen Eichensehr, The OPM Hack and the New DOD Law of War Manual,
JUST SEC. (June 17, 2015, 9:37 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/23960/opm-
hack-dod-law-war-manual/.
16. U.S. Rep. Matt Cartwright Questions KeyPoint CEO Regarding the OPM Data
Breach, YouTUBE (June 24, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QacBh
KSkPSI.
17. See, e.g., Eichensehr, supra note 15; Henry Farrell, The Hack on the U.S. Gov-
ernment Was Not a 'Cyber Pearl Harbor' (But It Was a Very Big Deal), WASH.
POST (June 15, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/
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While the debate on terminology and appropriate characterization rages,
several areas of common ground have emerged. It is widely accepted that
cyber attacks could be significantly more damaging, that the United States is
vulnerable to devastating cyber attacks and that more must be done to secure
computer networks and critical cyber infrastructure from future potential
devastation. Temporary denial of online service is inconvenient, defacement
of websites is embarrassing, and the theft of data may well be damaging. But
future attacks could potentially disrupt public infrastructure with catastrophic
consequences by interfering with air traffic control systems; shutting down
public transport networks; disrupting emergency services; overriding controls
for hydroelectric dams or nuclear power generation plants; or cutting off na-
tional or regional power supplies.18 Given the increasing sophistication of
virtual attacks,19 it is presumably only a matter of time before those individu-
als intent on wreaking havoc use cyberspace as the operational theatre of
choice. Additionally, there is a broad thirst for clarity on the proper charac-
terization of hacks like those against Sony and OPM. Do these attacks consti-
tute acts of war, acts of terrorism, crimes on a very large scale, vandalism, or
all of the above? What are legitimate responses to attacks of this kind? What
is and is not a permitted response? And of the permitted responses, which of
them might constitute the most effective policy response?
For international lawyers, much of the popular debate, including choice
of terminology in the characterization of the operations directed against the
United States, evokes disquiet and frustration. The prevalence of the term
"attack" to describe a cyber operation is a classic example. The popular use
of the term is entirely understandable, and yet "attack" is a legal term of art
with significant, potentially profound, legal and policy ramifications.
My intention is to focus on the relevant international legal concepts and
to identify and discuss some of the ramifications arising from an international
wp/2015/06/15/the-hack-on-the-u-s-government-was-not-a-cyber-pearl-harbor-
but-it-was-a-very-big-deal/; Charlie Dunlap, Cyber Operations and the New
Defense Department Law of War Manual: Initial Impressions, LAWFARE (June
15, 2015, 3:00 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/cyber-operations-and-new-
defense-department-law-war-manual-initial-impressions.
18. See, e.g., RICHARD A. CLARKE & ROBERT K. KNAKE, CYBER WAR: THE NEXT
THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT 64-68 (2010);
Elisabeth Bumiller & Thom Shanker, Panetta Warns of Dire Threat of Cyber-
attack on U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/
12/world/panetta-warns-of-dire-threat-of-cyberattack.html?_r--0.
19. See Holger Stark, Mossad's Miracle Weapon: Stuxnet Virus Opens New Era of
Cyber War, SPIEGEL (Aug. 8 2011, 3:04 PM), http://www.spiegel.de/intema-
tional/world/mossad-s-miracle-weapon-stuxnet-virus-opens-new-era-of-cyber-
war-a-778912.html. The Stuxnet virus, used to attack the Iranian nuclear pro-
gram, has been described as the most sophisticated computer virus ever devel-
oped, because it was designed to specifically target a particular program and to
infect a "secure" computer system unconnected to the Internet. Id.
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legal analysis of cyber operations of the kind experienced by SONY and
OPM. Thus, although cyber defensive strategies to improve security against
future cyber operations targeting critical infrastructure or the types of re-
sponses permitted by international law to hacks of this kind are clearly im-
portant issues that deserve greater attention, this article has a different focus.
H. THE TALLINN MANUAL ON CYBER WARFARE
The international group of experts responsible for the drafting of the
Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare (Tal-
linn Manual) has already undertaken comprehensive analysis of the interna-
tional legal issues relevant to the Sony and OPM hacks.20 The initiative to
draft the Tallinn Manual was unusual because proactive clarification of ap-
plicable international law rarely occurs. The making of new, or even the clar-
ification of existing, international law has tended to be reactive, often
requiring a major catalyst to expose the need for either clarification or regu-
lation. It has been rare in the history of international law for new develop-
ment to preempt potential subsequent catastrophe. The initiative to draft the
Tallinn Manual should, therefore, be warmly welcomed.
The authors of the Tallinn Manual, working under the auspices of the
NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCD COE) in Tal-
linn, Estonia, recognized the potential for cyber warfare with devastating
consequences for the victims of attacks and opted not to wait until such
events occur before undertaking proactive clarification of the applicable
law.21 It would be disingenuous, however, to imply that there was no reactive
element in the drafting of the Tallinn Manual. The preparation of the Tallinn
Manual under the auspices of the NATO CCD COE was not coincidental.
The NATO Centre was established as a reaction to a major denial of service
cyber operation against Estonia in 2007.22 Eneken Tikk, Kadri Kaska, and
Liis Vihul have provided a comprehensive analysis of the nature of those
cyber operations and, particularly, the distinct phases of the operations, mani-
fest not only by ebbs and flows in the intensity and scale, but also in the level
of coordination and the sophistication of the operations.23 This catalyst for
the establishment of the NATO Centre also led NATO members to recognize
the potential for cyber warfare with devastating consequences, and so the
20. See TALLINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAw APPLICABLE TO CYBER
WARFARE (2013) (Michael N. Schmitt ed.), http://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/
ebooks/files/356296245.pdf [hereinafter TALLINN MANUAL].
21. See About Cyber Defence Centre, NATO CooP. CYBER DEF. CTR. OF EXCEL-
LENCE, https://ccdcoe.orglabout-us.html (last visited May 9, 2016).
22. NATO Opens New Centre of Excellence on Cyber Defence, NATO (May 14,
2008), http://www.nato.int/doculupdate/2008/05-may/e0514a.html.
23. See Eneken Tikk et al., International Cyber Incidents: Legal Considerations,
NATO Coop. CYBER DEF. CTR. OF EXCELLENCE 15-34 (2010), https://ccdcoe
.org/publications/books/legalconsiderations.pdf.
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authors of the Tallinn Manual have been proactively encouraged and sup-
ported to clarify the applicable law.
The original Tallinn Manual, published in 2013, includes two parts: Part
A dealing with cyber security and the jus ad bellum (or the International Law
on the Use of Force), and Part B with the jus in bello (also known as the Law
of Armed Conflict (LOAC) or International Humanitarian Law).24 Since the
publication of Tallinn Manual 1.0, a second international group of experts
has convened to work on Tallinn Manual 2.0, a second volume of the manual
to identify other international law applicable to cyber operations, such as, for
example, the law of sovereignty, jurisdiction, international human rights law,
diplomatic law, the law of State (and of international organization) responsi-
bility, air law, space law, law of the sea, and the law of peace operations
below the threshold of the law applicable to force.25
The basic approach of the international group of experts for Tallinn
Manual 1.0 (the international group of experts for Tallinn Manual 2.0 has
adopted the same approach) was that relevant rules of conventional (treaty-
based) and customary international law apply as much to cyber operations as
they do to physical (or non-virtual) conduct.26 In other words, there is noth-
ing specific to the means of conducting the activity that precludes the appli-
cation of international law. This approach has been adopted notwithstanding
the Tallinn Manual's acknowledgement that "at the time the current interna-
tional legal norms (whether customary or treaty-based) emerged, cyber tech-
nology was not on the horizon. Consequently, there is a risk that cyber
practice [by states] may quickly outdistance agreed understandings as to its
governing legal regime."27
The Tallinn Manual identifies two extreme positions: the first is consis-
tent with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) position in the Nuclear
Weapons Advisory Opinion and states that the law of armed conflict applies
"to any use of force regardless of the weapons employed";28 the second posi-
tion applies the Permanent Court of Justice's dictum in the Lotus Case ex-
plaining that acts not prohibited by international law are generally
permitted.29 None of the members of the international group of experts has
adopted the latter view and, as the Tallinn Manual asserts,30 the former ap-
24. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at v-vi.
25. Research, Tallinn Manual, NATO Coop. CYBER DEF. CTR. OF EXCELLENCE,
https://ccdcoe.org/research.html (last visited May 9, 2016).
26. See id.
27. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 3.
28. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996
I.C.J. 226, ¶ 39 (July 8), http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/7495.pdf.
29. See SS 'Lotus' (France v Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 18 (Sept. 7),
http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/serieA 10/30_Lotus-Arret.pdf.
30. See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 3.
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proach conforms to the views of both the International Committee of Red
Cross (ICRC)31 and the U.S. government. 32 The U.S. Department of Defense
has reaffirmed the President's approach in the 2014 Strategy for Cyberspace
and cited the U.S. submission to a U.N. group of governmental experts,
which the submission acknowledged had already accepted that general rules
of international law apply to activities in cyberspace:
But the challenge is not whether existing international law applies
to State behavior in cyberspace. As the 2012-13 GGE affirmed,
international law does apply, and such law is essential to regulat-
ing State conduct in this domain. The challenge is providing deci-
sion-makers with considerations that may be taken into account
when determining how existing international law applies to cyber
activities. Despite this challenge, history has shown that States,
through consultation and cooperation, have repeatedly and suc-
cessfully applied existing bodies of law to new technologies. It
continues to be the US view that all States will benefit from a
stable international ICT [information and communication technol-
ogies] environment in which existing international law is the foun-
dation for responsible State behavior in cyberspace.33
Adopting the position that international law applies just as much to
cyber operations as to any other type of operations is not tantamount to argu-
ing that the existing international legal framework is entirely capable of regu-
lating all cyber operations. The Tallinn Manual emphasizes this point.
However, the general approach of the Tallinn Manual's international group
of experts and also of states and international organizations certainly facili-
tates identification of the relevant legal framework applicable to attacks such
as those experienced by Sony and the OPM.
The Tallinn Manual is not a source of law and does not represent the
position either of NATO, any state, or any other organization. Instead the
authors of the Tallinn Manual insist that it "be understood as an expression
solely of the opinions of the [i]ntemational [g]roup of [e]xperts, all acting in
their personal capacity."34 The Tallinn Manual adopts the orthodox premise
31. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, International Humanitarian Law and Chal-
lenges of Contemporary Armed Conflict, ICRC Doc. 31IC/1 1/5.1.2, at 36-37
(Oct. 2011).
32. International Strategy for Cyberspace: Prosperity, Security and Openness in a
Networked World, PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., BARACK OBAMA 9 (May 2011),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rssviewer/internationalstrate
gy-vforcyberspace.pdf.
33. Law of War Manual, 994 (Dep't of Defense, 2015), (citing U.S. Submission to
the U.N. Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of In-
formation and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security 1
(2014-15)).
34. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 11.
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that international law regulates the use of force in two key respects. 35 The jus
ad bellum regulates the circumstances in which states are permitted to resort
to force.36 This body of international law imposes a general prohibition on
use of force while allowing notable exceptions, principally force in national
self-defense or under the auspices of U.N. Security Council approval.37 The
jus in bello applies to situations of armed conflict irrespective of compliance
with the jus ad bellum by any or all of the parties to the conflict.38 The jus in
bello regulates the conduct of hostilities, including the law of targeting, and
imposes minimum standards of treatment for various categories of victims of
armed conflict.39
Both of these bodies of law, the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello,
incorporate notions of "attack" with different legal ramifications arising from
the respective contexts whenever the respective elements of an "attack" are
satisfied.40 The Tallinn Manual covers these areas of international law as
they relate to cyber operations, and this article will also consider each in turn.
A. The Jus ad Bellum and Cyber Operations
The primary reference to the term "attack" in the context of the jus ad
bellum arises in relation to a key exception to the general prohibition against
resort to force. An "armed attack" is the critical prerequisite for legitimate
resort to military force in self-defense by States acting individually (in de-
fense of themselves) or collectively (in defense of another State).41 The right
of national self-defense is recognized in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter which
states, in relevant part, that: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack oc-
curs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has
taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."42
Article 51 is an important provision, because it is one of only two ex-
plicit exceptions in the Charter to the general prohibition on resort to force.43
35. Id. at 13.
36. Id. at 4.
37. Id. at 43.
38. Id. at 4.
39. Id. at 105.
40. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 7.
41. U.N. Charter art. 51.
42. Id.
43. Id. art. 42, 51. The other explicit exception is Article 42, which permits the
U.N. Security Council to authorize armed force against a State in order to
maintain or to restore international peace and security. It is true that Article 53,
paragraph I recognizes the authority of a regional organization to use armed
force, but only if the relevant regional organization has the prior approval of
the Security Council. So, Article 53, paragraph 1 constitutes a specific applica-
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Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter imposes a treaty obligation that "[a]ll Mem-
bers shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in
any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."44
The critical questions here are: (1) what conduct constitutes a threat or
use of force falling within the scope of the prohibition in Article 2(4); (2)
what conduct constitutes an "armed attack" triggering resort to force in legiti-
mate self-defense; and (3) what is the relationship between prohibited
"force" and an "armed attack"? Are they equivalent or is there a difference
between them?
In relation to the first question-what conduct constitutes "force" pro-
hibited by Article 2(4)-the Charter text offers no explanation. It is well
known from the historical development of the prohibition on the use of force,
as well as from the travaux prdparatories to Article 2(4), that the wording of
the provision was intended to cover all resorts to military force.45 The moti-
vation for such breadth in scope was to overcome the limitations of earlier
prohibitions on resort to war as an instrument of national policy.46 The inten-
tion was not an absolute prohibition on resort to military force but a pre-
sumptive prohibition, subject to certain exceptions enumerated elsewhere in
the Charter.47 The U.N. drafters agreed that the scope of the prohibition did
not extend to economic and political force and, as the Tallinn Manual ex-
plains, this exclusion was reaffirmed in the drafting of the U.N. General As-
sembly's 1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations.48
tion of the Security Council's Article 42 authority rather than a separate excep-
tion to Article 2, paragraph 4. Article 107 of the U.N. Charter permitted any
Member State to use armed force against renewed aggression by any of the
defeated Axis Powers from World War 1-so Germany or Japan-but this
authority was an interim exception to Article 2, paragraph 4. Finally, pursuant
to Articles 10 and 12, the U.N. General Assembly could make recommenda-
tions to the Member States of the U.N. to use armed force, particularly in cir-
cumstances in which the Security Council was precluded from acting pursuant
to Article 42, but this hardly constitutes an explicit exception to Article 2, para-
graph 4. Member States of the U.N. would still need to act on the basis of the
recommendation before the question of a possible breach of Article 2, para-
graph 4 would even arise.
44. Id. art. 2, para. 4.
45. See generally Timothy L. H. McCormack, Anticipatory Self-Defense in the
Legislative History of the U.N. Charter, 25 ISR. L. REV. 1-42 (1991).
46. See generally id. (discussing the ability of States to avoid treaty obligations
prohibiting resort to war by simply not declaring war as a major incentive in
the choice of terminology to ensure the broader scope of Article 2, paragraph 4
of the U.N. Charter).
47. See id. at 8.
48. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 46.
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The ICJ in the Nicaragua case 49 provided helpful jurisprudence on the
scope of the prohibition on the use of force. The court found, for example,
that the laying of mines in Nicaragua's internal or territorial waters and at-
tacks on Nicaraguan ports, installations, and a naval base all constituted force
covered by the prohibition and were therefore unlawful unless subject to an
exception.50 Direct intervention with kinetic force, such as the laying of naval
mines and the perpetration of kinetic attacks against certain facilities and
installations, unquestionably constitutes force within the scope of the prohi-
bition. Perhaps the more interesting jurisprudence was the court's demarca-
tion of types of indirect intervention by the United States in Nicaragua in the
form of assistance to the contras.51 The court found that the arming and train-
ing of the contras for armed activities within Nicaragua also constituted a
threat or use of force whereas "the mere supply of funds to the contras, while
undoubtedly an act of intervention in the internal affairs of Nicaragua . . .
does not in itself amount to a use of force."52 The court made no additional
attempt to explain the bases for its demarcation. Some indirect intervention
will be substantial enough to constitute prohibited force, and some will not.
In relation to the second question-what conduct constitutes an "armed
attack" triggering resort to force in legitimate self-defense-the text of Arti-
cle 51 offers no explanation and, again, the ICJ in the Nicaragua case pro-
vides helpful jurisprudence extracted here in some detail. The court
determined:
[t]here appears now to be general agreement on the nature of the
acts which can be treated as constituting armed attacks. In particu-
lar, it may be considered to be agreed that an armed attack must be
understood as including not merely action by regular armed forces
across an international border, but also "the sending by or on be-
half of a State of armed bands, groups, irregulars or mercenaries,
which carry out acts of armed force against another State of such
gravity as to amount to" (inter alia) an actual armed attack con-
ducted by regular forces, "or its substantial involvement therein."
This description, contained in Article 3, paragraph g), of the Defi-
nition of Aggression annexed to General Assembly resolution
3314 (XXIX), may be taken to reflect customary international
law. The Court sees no reason to deny that, in customary law, the
prohibition of armed attacks may apply to the sending by a State
of armed bands to the territory of another State, if such an opera-
tion, because of its scale and effects, would have been classified
as an armed attack rather than as a mere frontier incident had it
49. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).




International Law and Cyber "Attacks"
been carried out by regular armed forces. But the Court does not
believe that the concept of "armed attack" includes not only acts
by armed bands where such acts occur on a significant scale but
also assistance to rebels in the form of the provision of weapons or
logistical or other support. Such assistance may be regarded as a
threat or use of force, or amount to intervention in the internal or
external affairs of other States.53
The court relied upon the 1974 U.N. General Assembly Definition of
Aggression and affirmed that the critical determining factor for satisfying the
requisite threshold of an armed attack is "scale and effects" rather than the
specific modalities of the deployment of force.54 It is unquestionably the case
that cross-border deployment of regular armed forces constitutes an armed
attack. If the cumulative scale and effects of cross-border raids (each of
which individually may have constituted no more than a "mere frontier inci-
dent") by irregular forces approximate those emanating from an armed attack
by regular armed forces, according to the court, the self-defense exception
applies.55 In 1986, this finding was a significant normative statement, and it
has remained influential since. But the court was obviously keen to limit a
potentially wide application of the norm. The final two sentences of the para-
graph above reflect the court's desire to pare back the scope of the norm.
Sufficiently severe cumulative effects of cross-border raids may constitute an
"armed attack," but supply of weapons and logistical or other support will
not be sufficient. That sort of support may constitute a threat or use of force,
but it will not rise to the threshold of an "armed attack."56
The court's findings provide a response to the third question-what is
the relationship between prohibited force and an "armed attack"-by identi-
fying a normative gap between violations of the prohibition on resort to force
and the right to respond with force to an armed attack. The court explicitly
recognized this gap in declaring it "necessary to distinguish the most grave
forms of the use of force (those constituting an armed attack) from other less
grave forms."57 The court had, after all, found that the supply of weapons to,
and training of, the contras did constitute a use of force against Nicaragua,
but that such interventions were not sufficiently grave to constitute an armed
attack triggering the right to respond with force in self-defense. Michael
Schmitt deftly articulates the approach of the court as clarifying the existence
53. Id. at 14, ¶ 195.
54. See id.
55. See Nicaragua, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 195.
56. See id. at *543 (dissent).
57. Id. at 1 191.
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of "a normative schema in which all armed attacks are uses of force, but not
all uses of force are armed attacks."58
The court's emphasis on consequential effects rather than on means or
modalities for the deployment of force has been repeatedly reaffirmed.59 For
example, in its 1996 Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, the court declared
the choice of weapon to be immaterial to the application of the normative
framework on the use of force:
These provisions [Articles 2(4), 51 and 42 of the U.N. Charter] do
not refer to specific weapons. They apply to any use of force, re-
gardless of the weapons employed. The Charter neither expressly
prohibits, nor permits, the use of any specific weapon, including
nuclear weapons. A weapon that is already unlawful per se,
whether by treaty or custom, does not become lawful by reason of
its being used for a legitimate purpose under the Charter.60
In the aftermath of 9/11, the U.N. Security Council implicitly character-
ized the events of that fateful day as constituting an armed attack by explic-
itly recognizing "the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in
accordance with the Charter."61 Intriguingly, the United States could only
have used this recognized right of self-defense to defend itself against any
future attacks and not against the attacks that already occurred. It is difficult
to imagine how anyone could seriously argue that the 9/11 operations consti-
tuted anything less than an "armed attack," given the scale of the loss of life
and the physical destruction, let alone the devastating economic and security
flow-on effects. The horrific incidents of 9/11 reaffirm the importance of
focusing on scale and effects rather than on a narrow categorization of
weapon types that fit the descriptor "armed." As the events of that fateful day
so spectacularly demonstrate, fueled civilian aircrafts can pose as formidably
destructive "weapons."
The Tallinn Manual applies a normative framework to cyber operations.
Rule 11, the Definition of the Use of Force, and Rule 13, Self-Defence
Against Armed Attack, unsurprisingly adopt a "scale and effects" approach
to determine both threshold questions: (1) whether a cyber operation quali-
fies as a use of force; and, if so, (2) whether the operation reaches the "most
grave" level of an "armed attack" triggering the right to respond with force in
self-defense.62 For example, the Tallinn Manual asserts that "[a]cts that in-
58. Michael N. Schmitt, "Attack" as a Term of Art in International Law: The
Cyber Operations Context, 4th International Conference on Cyber Conflict,
283, at 286 (NATO CCD COE Publications 2012), https://ccdcoe.org/publica-
tions/2012proceedings/5_2_SchmittAttackAsATermOfArt.pdf.
59. See Legality of the Threat, supra note 28, at 226, ¶ 39.
60. Id.
61. See S.C. Res. 1368 (Sept. 12, 2001); see also S.C. Res. 1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
62. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 47 ¶ 6.
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jure or kill persons or damage or destroy objects are unambiguously uses of
force."63 Analogous to the ICJ's characterization of indirect U.S. intervention
in Nicaragua through support to the contras, the international group of ex-
perts formed the view that "merely funding a hacktivist group conducting
cyber operations as part of an insurgency would not be a use of force"
whereas "providing an organized group with malware and the training neces-
sary to use it to carry out cyber attacks against another State would . . .
qualify."64
Beyond these specific examples, it is impossible for the Tallinn Manual
to precisely determine the demarcations of both thresholds. The ICJ had the
relatively easier task of applying the legal framework to the specific facts of
the Nicaragua case, and the judges repeatedly asserted that they were re-
stricted to answering the legal questions set forth by the parties.65 In contrast,
the Tallinn Manual attempts to identify the generally applicable legal frame-
work to cyber operations, and the best way the international group of experts
could do this was through identifying illustrative examples of cyber opera-
tions.66 The Tallinn Manual acknowledges this limitation and identifies a
number of qualitative indicia that states are likely to take into account in any
use of force assessment.67 The identified indicia include severity, immediacy,
directness, invasiveness, measurability of effects, military character, state in-
volvement, and presumptive legality of any cyber operations.68 None of these
indicia alone are intended to be determinative of the use of force.69 Instead,
they are listed as likely qualitative indicators.70
Nicholas Tsagourias is skeptical of the identification of qualitative indi-
cia.71 He concedes that the Tallinn Manual acknowledges that the indicia are
neither exhaustive nor legal, but he adds "whether they provide any guidance
63. Id. at 48 ¶ 8.
64. Id. at 46, ¶ 4.
65. See generally Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
66. See generally TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20.
67. Id. at 48-51, ¶ 9.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 48, ¶ 9.
70. Id.
71. Nicholas Tsagourias, The Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable
to Cyber Warfare: A Commentary on Chapter II-The Use of Force, 15 Y.B.
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is also conjectural."72 Despite Tsagourias's skepticism, it is difficult to imag-
ine what alternative course of action remained open to the international group
of experts. One possibility would have been to argue that the Tallinn Manual
must remain silent on operations that fall short of the threshold and the grave
operations that rise to the level of "armed attack," since there is such lack of
clarity around the demarcations surrounding the use of force. However, given
the rationale for the Tallinn Manual, such a position would constitute abject
failure because the Tallinn Manual is intended to help provide clarification to
states.73 Perhaps it is too early to say whether or not the indicia will be useful
to states in deciding how to characterize particular operations against them
and possible responsive measures. However, Tsagourias's comments confirm
that the mere publication of the indicia is generating a discussion that would
not have occurred without the preparedness of the international group of ex-
perts to articulate their position.
Michael Schmitt identified the indicia he considered likely to "influence
assessments by states as to whether operations amounted to a use of force"74
over a decade before the Tallinn Manual was drafted. In a subsequent article
revisiting the jus ad bellum and cyber operations, Schmitt helpfully applied
his indicia to the network attacks on Estonia in 2007.75 His analysis illus-
trates how the indicia might be applied by States:
Although [the attacks against Estonia] caused no deaths, injury, or
physical damage, the attacks fundamentally affected the operation
of the entire Estonian society. Government functions and services
were severely disrupted, the economy was thrown into turmoil,
and daily life for the Estonian people was negatively affected. The
consequences far exceeded mere inconvenience or irritation. The
effects were immediate and, in the case of confidence in govern-
ment and economic activity, wide-spread and long-term. They
were also direct, as with the inability to access funds and interfer-
ence with the distribution of government benefits. Since some of
the targeted systems were designed to be secure, the operations
were highly invasive. While the consequences were severe, they
were difficult to quantify, since most involved denial of service
rather than destruction of data. Although political and economic
actions are presumptively legitimate in use-of-force terms, these
operations constituted more than merely pressuring the target
state. Instead, they involved intentionally frustrating governmental
72. Id.
73. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 3.
74. Michael N. Schmitt, Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in Inter-
national Law: Thoughts on a Normative Framework, 37 COLUM. J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. 885, 914-16 (1999).
75. Michael N. Schmitt, Cyber Operations and the Jus Ad Bellum Revisited, 56
VILL. L. REv. 569, 577 (2011).
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and economic functions. Taken together as a single "cyber-opera-
tion", the incident arguably reached the use-of-force threshold.
Had Russia been responsible for them under international law, it is
likely that the international community would have (or should
have) treated them as a use of force in violation of the [U.N.]
Charter and customary international law.76
Schmitt readily concedes the imprecision of his indicia and the concom-
itant reality that states will have significant latitude in their characterization
of cyber operations.77 Tsagourias is dubious about the merits of Schmitt's
(and the Tallinn Manual's) indicia and illustrates his concerns by application
of the indicia to the effects of the "Stuxnet worm."78 Despite the damage to
Iranian centrifuges and the setbacks the worm caused to the Iranian nuclear
program, Tsagourias is unconvinced that the operation reached the threshold
of a use of force on the basis of the application of the Tallinn Manual's
indicia.79 The quantification of damage and the precise de minimis threshold
for a use of force are obvious challenges to the characterization of cyber
operations. Schmitt is undoubtedly correct that clarification of these uncer-
tainties in the application of the normative threshold will come as state prac-
tice develops in response to increasingly frequent and severe cyber
operations.8o Perhaps until that state practice emerges, we are left with con-
jecture about precisely how states will apply the normative framework.
B. The Jus in Bello and Cyber Operations
The key reference to the term "attack" in the jus in bello appears in
Article 49(1) of Additional Protocol I of 1977.81 That provision defines "at-
tacks" for the purpose of the scope of application of LOAC as "acts of vio-
lence against the adversary, whether in offence or defence."82 So defined,
"attack" is a term of art. The ICRC's Commentary on the Additional Proto-
cols duly explains that, in the context of LOAC, "attack" should not be given
the ordinary meaning of "striking the first blow," but equated to "combat
action" more broadly.83 However, the Commentary does not attempt to ex-
plain what "violence" means or, for that matter, what "combat action"
entails.
76. Id.
77. Tsagourias, supra note 71, at 23-25.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 23.
80. Schmitt, supra note 75, at 578.
81. CLAUDE PILLOUD & JEAN DE PREUX, COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PRO-
TOCOLS TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS 601 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 603.
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The threshold requirement for the application of LOAC is the existence
of an armed conflict-not merely the existence of "attacks." Neither the Ge-
neva Conventions nor the Additional Protocols define "armed conflict." In-
stead the treaty texts state the circumstances in which the treaties apply84 and,
in the case of Additional Protocol II, also the circumstances in which that
particular Protocol does not apply.85 The Appeals Chamber of the Interna-
tional Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), in response to
Dusko Tadia's interlocutory challenge to the Tribunal's jurisdiction, stated:
"[A]n armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force be-
tween States or protracted violence between governmental authorities and
organized armed groups or between such groups within a State."86
This definitional statement has become the standard formulation reaf-
firmed in all subsequent international criminal trial jurisprudence, including
most recently at the International Criminal Court in all international trials
involving war crimes charges.87 The definition reflects the treaty provisions
on scope of application and distinguishes requisite thresholds for interna-
tional and non-international armed conflicts.88 An international armed con-
flict requires a much lower threshold and exists "whenever there is a resort to
armed force between [s]tates."89 A non-international armed conflict requires
a much higher threshold of "protracted violence between governmental au-
thorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a
[s]tate."90 This latter threshold has been clarified in repeated jurisprudence to
require the satisfaction of a sufficient level of intensity in the exchange of
hostilities and a sufficient level of organization of each of the non-state
armed groups party to the conflict.91 Given the allegations against North Ko-
rea and China in relation to the Sony and OPM hacks respectively, this arti-
84. See id. at 39, 41, 46, 1343.
85. See id. at 1380.
86. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on the Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, [ 70 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former
Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
87. See, e.g., U.S. v. Al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d 1141, 1181 (U.S.C.M.C.R. 2011),
vacated, No. 11-1324, 2013 WL 297726 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 25, 2013), reh'g en
banc granted, order vacated (Apr. 23, 2013), on reh'g en banc, 767 F.3d 1
(D.C. Cir. 2014), and affd in part, vacated in part, remanded, 767 F.3d 1 (D.C.
Cir. 2014), and vacated in part, 792 F.3d I (D.C. Cir. 2015).
88. For a more detailed analysis of the threshold requirements for the application of
LOAC, see Caitlin Dwyer & Tim McCormack, Conflict Characterisation, in
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ARMED CoNFLicr (Rain Liivoja &
Tim McCormack eds.) (2016).
89. See Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, at ¶ 70.
90. See id.
91. See, e.g., Al Bahlul, 820 F. Supp. 2d at 1181.
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cle will focus primarily upon the criteria for the existence of an international
armed conflict.
It is an accurate normative statement that where two or more states op-
pose each other through cyber operations involving conduct constituting Ar-
ticle 49 application programming interface (API) attacks "conducted by, or
attributable to, a [s]tate,"92 an international armed conflict exists, and the
relevant LOAC applies. There are, however, a number of important threshold
prerequisites to satisfy. First, attribution to a state is critical. Given that cyber
operations are invariably designed to obfuscate the responsibility trail, this
threshold preliminary issue will not necessarily be straightforward.93 Al-
though a state need not be directly involved through its armed forces, the
conduct of any of its agencies, including its intelligence or its law enforce-
ment agencies, will also be attributable to the state.94
There is an additional threshold issue as to the requisite level of vio-
lence. The prevailing view is that no particular degree of violence or inten-
tion is required for the existence of an international armed conflict; it is
sufficient that there be "a resort to armed force between [s]tates." 95 The Tal-
linn Manual reaffirms this prevailing view but also identifies a competing
view, which "requires greater extent, duration or intensity of hostilities al-
though proponents of this view have not agreed on any particular thresh-
old."96 The rationale for the competing view is that not all isolated incidents
"such as sporadic border clashes or naval incidents" have been treated as
international armed conflicts.97 The Tallinn Manual cites the Stuxnet opera-
tion as illustrative of the difficulties in determining requisite levels of armed
force for the existence of an international armed conflict.98 The release of the
Stuxnet malware caused significant physical damage to centrifuges in Iran's
nuclear fuel processing plant, but the international group of experts could not
agree on whether the damage was sufficient to trigger an international armed
conflict.99
Assuming, for the purposes of the analysis, that an international armed
conflict does exist and that cyber operations are being conducted in the con-
92. See Michael N. Schmitt, Classification of Cyber Conflict, 17(2) J. CONFLIcT &
SEC. L. 245, 252 (2012).
93. See generally Marco Roscini, Evidentiary Issues in International Disputes Re-
lated to State Responsibility for Cyber Operations 50 TEX. INT'L L. J. 233
(2015).
94. See Schmitt, Classification of Cyber Conflict, supra note 92, at 252.
95. This view is consistent with the ICRC Commentary to Common Article 2 to
the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949, for example.
96. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 83.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 83-84.
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text of that armed conflict, there remains an important question about what
conduct will constitute an "attack" within the meaning of Article 49 of Addi-
tional Protocol I. As explained above, the ICRC Commentary to Article 49
does not attempt to explain what "violence" means or, for that matter, what
"combat action" entails. The Tallinn Manual addresses this question in its
Rule 30 Definition of Cyber Attack: "A cyber attack is a cyber operation,
whether offensive or defensive, that is readily expected to cause injury or
death to persons or damage or destruction to objects."100 The influence of the
text of Article 49 of Additional Protocol I is apparent in the phrase "whether
offensive or defensive," but the Rule goes beyond the treaty text and the
ICRC Commentary by focussing on expected violent effects. Here the ap-
proach is redolent of the emphasis on "scale and effects" in the Tallinn Man-
ual's articulation of relevant jus ad bellum Rules.
The Tallinn Manual's Commentary refers explicitly to Article 49 of API
and asserts that resorting to violence distinguishes attacks from other military
operations.101 Consequently, non-violent operations, "such as psychological
cyber operations or cyber espionage, do not qualify as attacks."102 Popular
misunderstandings aside, it is difficult to imagine any serious challenge to
the normative veracity of this statement. Article 49 of Additional Protocol I
does, however, refer to "acts of violence," which could be interpreted nar-
rowly to mean that the modality of the conduct must be violent rather than
that the conduct generates violent consequences or effects. 103 Here the Com-
mentary to the Tallinn Manual demonstrates that the law of armed conflict
has already moved on from such a narrow interpretation. Weapons of mass
destruction-chemical, biological, and nuclear-do not rely on kinetic force
for their destructive effects, and yet their deployment in armed conflict un-
questionably constitutes an attack subject to the law of armed conflict. 104Ad-
ditionally, the international group of experts observe that the text of many
provisions of Additional Protocol I support this emphasis on effects. They
cite as examples: (a) Article 5 1(1) protecting the civilian population and indi-
vidual civilians from dangers arising from military operations; (b) the rule on
proportionality in Articles 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii) and 57(2)(b) mandating the
requisite calculus to include the expected "loss of civilian life, injury to civil-
100. Id. at 106.
101. Id.
102. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 106.
103. PILLOUD & DE PREUX, supra note 81, at 605.
104. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 106-07. Bill Boothby amplifies this argu-
ment. The willful release of deadly diseases, for example, does not involve
kinetic force, but would anyone seriously argue that an act of violence involv-
ing biological warfare absent other acts involving kinetic force could not con-
stitute an 'attack'? See Bill Boothby, Where Do Cyber Hostilities Fit in the
International Law Maze?, in NEW TECHNOLOGIES AND THE LAW OF ARMED
CONFLIcT 59, 60 (Hitoshi Nasu & Rob McLaughlin eds.) (2014).
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ians, damage to civilian objects or a combination thereof'; (c) Article 55 on
protection of the environment referring to "widespread, long-term and severe
damage"; and (d) Article 56 protecting works and installations containing
dangerous forces from attack where such attacks may cause severe losses
among the civilian population.105
Here, the issue is the scope of acts regulated by the law of armed con-
flict. The Tallinn Manual takes a broader approach by focussing upon the
violent effects of conduct rather than on whether the conduct itself is vio-
lent.106 But the international group of experts "agreed that de minimis damage
or destruction does not meet the threshold of harm required by this Rule."107
Knut Ddrmann of the ICRC takes an even broader approach.108 He argues
that since the definition of a military object in Article 52(2) of Additional
Protocol I refers to the neutralization of an object as a possible outcome of an
attack, even the disabling of a legitimate military object (which may not con-
stitute damage and certainly would not constitute destruction), also qualifies
as an attack regulated by the law of armed conflict.109
Rain Liivoja and Tim McCormack have commented elsewhere on the
approach of the Tallinn Manual to the requisite level of damage or destruc-
tion for conduct to constitute an attack regulated by the law of armed con-
flict. One strength of the Tallinn Manual is the recurrent articulation of
divergent views, in particular, the reference "to whether interference with the
functionality of an object could amount to an attack in the absence of physi-
cal destruction.",10 The Commentary explains that a minority of experts be-
lieve that loss of functionality alone could never constitute an attack.,]
However, the majority believe such an interference could qualify as "dam-
age"; thus, the operation could constitute an attack "if restoration of function-
ality requires replacement of physical components".112 The majority disagree,
however, as to whether the damage requirement would be met if functional-
105. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 107 (emphasis in original).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Knut Dormann, The Applicability of the Additional Protocols to Computer Net-
work Attacks: An ICRC Approach, INTERNATIONAL EXPERT CONFERENCE ON
COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACKS AND THE APPLICABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAW, 17-19 NOVEMBER 2004, STOCKHOLM, SWEDEN: PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE, SWEDISH NATIONAL DEFENCE COLLEGE,
STOCKHOLM 139-153 (Karin Bystrom ed.) (2005).
109. Id. at 142-43.
110. Rain Liivoja & Tim McCormack, Law in the Virtual Battlespace: The Tallinn
Manual and the Jus in Bello, 15 Y.B. OF INT'L HUMANITARIAN LAW 45, 53
(2012).
111. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 108.
112. Id.
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ity could be restored by reinstalling the operating system (i.e., "replacement"
of the software).113
The Tallinn Manual's general approach of insisting on physical detri-
mental effects from the destruction of data results in any such destruction
qualifying as an attack only when it "results in the injury or death of individ-
uals or damage or destruction of physical objects."I14 Our analysis of this
conclusion was that it:
is not entirely unproblematic. Permanent destruction of data can
have significant ramifications, even though falling short of physi-
cal violence. For example, wiping out the data in the entire State's
banking system or patent database by means of a computer virus
may have far more deleterious consequences than the physical de-
struction of a single data centre. Yet, under the Manual, the former
would be an attack only if it can be demonstrated that some physi-
cal injury occurred, whereas the second is undoubtedly an attack.
This peculiarity is remedied slightly by the admission that causing
'serious illness and severe mental suffering that are tantamount to
injury' would qualify as an attack. Thus terrorising the civilian
population by means of cyber operations might rise to the level of
attack. Accordingly, were the cyber operations against the banking
system serious enough to cause wide-spread panic among the pop-
ulation, the argument could be made that the mental suffering of
the civilians was such as to qualify the operation as an attack.
The Manual arguably fails to take the destruction of data and the
value of digital assets sufficiently seriously. To a large extent this
reflects the current conceptual framework of LOAC, which has
not entirely caught up with the development of the concepts of
intellectual property and intangible assets. But the Manual's gen-
eral position on the destruction of data seems curious in view of
the fact that in Rule 82 it regards the destruction of digital cultural
property perfectly governable by LOAC. Certainly, the use of the
term 'property' in the context of cultural treasures may more read-
ily allow for the incorporation of intangible assets, but the time
has perhaps come to seriously consider whether an 'object' for the
purposes of the targeting rules in LOAC necessarily needs to have
corporeal existence.115
Identifying the relevant legal framework regulating cyber operations is a
relatively straightforward exercise. As the Tallinn Manual's Commentary
and scholarly critiques of the Tallinn Manual and its commentary demon-
strate, the substantially more complex issue is the application of that legal
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Liivoja & McCormack, supra note 110, at 53-54.
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framework to contemporary, and no doubt future, cyber operations. Future
state practice will reveal the extent to which existing analysis is useful and
will undoubtedly be closely scrutinized to determine how states interpret and
apply the law. Any relevant jurisprudence from courts and tribunals involv-
ing the interpretation and application of the normative framework to specific
facts will also be helpful in the clarification of the law. But it would be
fallacious to assume that existing uncertainties will evaporate in the face of
states' responses to cyber operations against them.
III. CHARACTERIZING THE OPM AND SONY "ATTACKS"
Attribution is a critical preliminary issue for the international legal char-
acterization of the OPM and Sony "attacks" and for any determination of
responsive measures the United States could lawfully undertake. Stealth and
the obfuscation of responsibility are often integral to cyber operations. Yet
the application of the normative framework is dependent upon attribution of
international legal responsibility to states.
On December 19, 2014, just weeks after the Sony "attack," the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) announced that it had sufficient evidence to
conclude that the North Korean government was responsible.116 Although un-
willing to disclose all its evidence, the Bureau's press release cited common-
alities with data-deletion malware, IP addresses, and modalities of a cyber
operation against South Korean banks and media outlets-all previously uti-
lized or undertaken by North Korea.117 There is skepticism in some circles
about the veracity of the FBI's determination,"1s but it is unusual for the U.S.
authorities to name those responsible so unequivocally and so relatively soon
after a damaging cyber hack. The United States was much more equivocal,
for example, about attribution of responsibility for the OPM hack. Although
many suspected Chinese responsibility for the theft of sensitive OPM data,119
senior U.S. officials quickly denied any certainty about attribution of respon-




118. See, e.g., Marc Rogers, No, North Korea Didn't Hack Sony, DAILY BEAST
(Dec. 24, 2014), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/12/24/no-north-
korea-didn-t-hack-sony.html.
119. See, e.g., David E. Sanger & Julie Hirschfield Davis, Hacking Linked to China
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sibility.120 More recently, media reports suggest that China arrested several
individuals for the OPM attack and has attempted to distance the state from
any responsibility.121 Unidentified U.S. officials were reported to say that "it
has been difficult to confirm whether the people rounded up were connected
to the OPM breach," but that "[i]f China caught the real perpetrators, 'it
would be the most important arrest that we've perhaps seen in
cybercrime.' "122
For the purposes of the present discussion, let us assume, hypothetically,
that international legal responsibility could be attributed to North Korea and
China for the Sony and OPM hacks, respectively. In reality, of course, such
attribution is far from certain, but the hypothetical assumption facilitates the
subsequent legal characterization.
Turning first to the jus in bello, it is difficult to argue that either the
Sony or the OPM hacks triggered an international armed conflict between the
United States and North Korea or China, respectively. Despite popular calls
to recognize these hacks as "acts of war," it is reassuring that the Obama
administration has steadfastly refused to characterize either hack as such.123
Despite the prevailing view that an international armed conflict exists when-
ever there is "a resort to armed force between States" and that no particular
threshold of violence or intention is required,124 the counterview that not all
isolated incidents "such as sporadic border clashes or naval incidents" have
been treated by states as international armed conflictsl25 is reassuring. Imag-
ine the possibilities for escalation and devastation if the United States consid-
ered the Sony and OPM hacks as tantamount to declarations of war and
responded accordingly.
Another jus in bello consideration arises if we assume, hypothetically,
that the Sony and OPM hacks each occurred in the context of existing inter-
national armed conflicts between the United States and North Korea, and
between the United States and China, respectively. In such circumstances,
would either hack amount to an attack within the meaning of Article 49 of
120. See, e.g., Patrick Tucker, NSA Chief Don't Assume China Hacked OPM, DE-
FENSE ONE (June 24, 2015), http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2015/06/
nsa-chief-wont-assume-china-hacked-opm/1 16203/.
121. See Ellen Nakashima, Chinese Government Has Arrested Hackers It Says
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Additional Protocol I?126 Applying the approach of the Tallinn Manual,127 the
OPM hack would not seem to satisfy the criteria. No loss of life or injury to
persons ensued, and no physical damage or destruction was caused.128 Such
analysis might change depending upon how, if at all, the data is used. If
identity fraud, for example, becomes rampant against many of those whose
personal information was stolen, injury and damage may well become a real-
ity. Meanwhile, however, the U.S. government reportedly characterizes the
hack as cyber espionage-"spying to help a foreign government, in this case,
build databases on U.S. government employees and officials."29
The analysis here is different for the Sony hack. Although, again, no
death or physical injury to persons occurred, there was some damage in that
Sony lost the functionality of thousands of its personal computers. 130 While it
could be argued that the malware did not physically damage or destroy the
individual units of hardware, they were rendered useless.131 On loss of func-
tionality, the majority of the Tallinn Manual experts considered that "if resto-
ration of functionality requires replacement of physical components," such
loss constitutes damage and qualifies as an attack.132 A few experts went so
far as to suggest "interference with functionality that necessitates data resto-
ration, while not requiring physical replacement of components or reinstalla-
tion of the operating system, qualifies as an attack."33 Even if the damage to
Sony were sufficiently serious to qualify as an attack, given that there was no
international armed conflict between the United States and North Korea, such
analysis is of limited practical consequence.
Perhaps the more significant legal analysis involves the application of
the jus ad bellum. Neither the Sony nor the OPM hacks are sufficiently grave
to constitute armed attacks justifying a forceful response by the United States
in self-defense, and it is perhaps unsurprising that the United States has cho-
sen not to characterize them as such.134 Neither hack resulted in loss of life or
physical injury. Both hacks involved the exfiltration of massive amounts of
sensitive data and, in the case of Sony, the loss of functionality of thousands
126. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 49,
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 25.
127. See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 106, ¶ 1.
128. See id.
129. Nakashima, supra note 212.




132. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 108, ¶ 10.
133. Id. at 109, ¶ 11.
134. See Sheppard, supra note 13.
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of personal computers. 135 Even this latter physical damage could hardly be
characterized, "because of its scale and effects,"136 as amounting to an armed
attack. Perhaps if each of the Sony buildings, in which personal computers
were housed, had been destroyed, the cumulative effect of any such strikes
may well have risen to the level of an armed attack. But that is not what
happened. Sony's buildings and other infrastructure remain intact and the
corporation continues to operate.1 37
However, it is arguable that the damage to the functionality of Sony's
personal computers constituted a use of force short of an "armed attack." The
Tallinn Manual's assertion that "[a]cts that injure or kill persons or damage
or destroy objects are unambiguously uses of force"138 arguably applies here.
The counter argument is, as above, that the malware only targeted the func-
tionality of Sony's computers and did not physically damage or destroy the
individual units of hardware.139 But if Sony was required to replace all the
individual units, the gravity of the hack would be more pronounced and the
United States would be more likely to consider the hack an unlawful use of
force. Even if the level of damage did not rise to the requisite threshold, the
United States would nevertheless be entitled to reach the same conclusion as
the ICJ in its characterization of the United States' financing of the contra
rebels: the Sony hack constituted a violation of the U.S. sovereignty through
an unlawful intervention in its internal affairs. '0
135. See Hess, supra note 130.
136. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.),
1986 I.C.J. 14, 1 195 (June 27).
137. Ryan Faughnder, Exclusive: A Year After the Hack, Sony's Chief Explains How
Hollywood Heals Its Wounds, L.A. TVIMES (Nov. 18, 2015, 3:00 AM), http://
www.latimes.com/entertainmentlenvelope/cotown/Ia-et-ct-sony-hack-year-
later-2015 1118-story.html.
138. TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 48, ¶ 8.
139. See Hess, supra note 130.
140. See G.A. Res. 36/103, U.N. Doc. A/RES 36/103 (Dec. 9, 1981). In 1981, for
example, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Inadmis-
sibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States, and,
inter alia, affirmed the following:
The right of States and peoples to have free access to information and to
develop fully, without interference, their system of information and mass
media and to use their information media in order to promote their politi-
cal, social, economic and cultural interests and aspirations, based, inter
alia, on the relevant articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the principles of the new international information order.
Id. At stake in the hack on Sony was the U.S. Constitutional right of Freedom
of Expression and specifically the freedom of the Sony Corporation to publi-
cally release the movie The Interview-a parody of the North Korean leader
Kim Jong Un. Id.
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Unlawful intervention raises the possibility of countermeasures: conduct
recognized by international law as a permissible response to intervention in-
tended specifically to convince another state to cease and desist from its ille-
gal conduct.141 Article 22 of The International Law Commission's Draft
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts affirms
the permissibility of conduct that would otherwise constitute a violation of
international law in certain limited circumstances, and the ICJ has reaffirmed
the doctrine of countermeasures and identified the criteria that must be satis-
fied.142 The Tallinn Manual discusses countermeasures to cyber violations of
a State's sovereignty that do not amount to an "armed attack,"143 and Michael
Schmitt explains, in his own detailed analysis of the subject, that counter-
measures to unlawful cyber operations are all too frequently overlooked.144
Only States can lawfully undertake countermeasures and only in response to
unlawful intervention attributable to other States.145 The Sony Corporation
could not, therefore, lawfully undertake countermeasures itself but, presuma-
bly, the United States could do so on its behalf, assuming all other prerequi-
sites (the nature of the hack and the damage it caused, the hack was
attributable to North Korea, and any countermeasure is proportionate to the
injury suffered) are satisfied.146
For hacks like that of the OPM, which constitute cyber espionage and
are not unlawful, the prospect of U.S.-China collaboration on accountability
for those responsible is intriguing. Although it is still too early to tell whether
the individuals arrested by Chinese authorities are indeed responsible for the
OPM hack, if that proves to be the case and those individuals are success-
fully prosecuted in Chinese courts, the experience will be a landmark in U.S.-
Chinese co-operation on the investigation of malicious cyber operations. It
would be ironic if the emergence of a mutual interest in the prevention of
damaging reciprocal cyber espionage provided a catalyst for improved Sino-
U.S. relations.
141. See Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 2001 Y.B. INT'L
L. COMM'N, U.N. Sales No. E.04V.17 (Part 2) (2001).
142. See Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, ¶ 23 (Apr. 9); Nicar. v
U.S., 1986 I.C.J. 14, 11 283, 292 (June 27); Gabbikovo-Nagymaros Project
(Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, ¶ 47 (Sept. 25).
143. See TALLINN MANUAL, supra note 20, at 36-41.
144. See Michael N. Schmitt, "Below the Threshold" Cyber Operations: The Coun-
termeasures Response Option and International Law, 54 VA. J. INT'L L., 697
(2014).
145. See id. at 703, 707.
146. See id. at 723.
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